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Cultural Influences in Negotiations: A Four Country Comparative Analysis 
 
Abstract 
Empirical work systematically comparing variations across a range of countries is scarce. 
A comprehensive framework having the potential to yield comparable information across 
countries on 12 negotiating tendencies was proposed more than 20 years ago by Weiss and 
Stripp; however, the framework was never operationalized or empirically tested. A review 
of the negotiation and cross cultural research that have accumulated over the last two 
decades led to refinements in the definition of the dimensions in the framework. We 
operationalized four dimensions in the Negotiation Orientations Framework and 
developed the Negotiation Orientations Inventory (NOI) to assess individual orientations on 
those four dimensions. Data were collected from a sample of 1000 business people and 
university students with business experience from Finland, Mexico, Turkey, and the 
United States. Results are presented and further scale development is discussed. Findings 
establish the utility of the dimensions in the framework in making comparisons between 
the four countries. 
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Cultural Influences in Negotiations: A Four Country Comparative Analysis 
 
The effects of cross cultural differences on international negotiation are widely 
acknowledged. Cohen (1997) notes that cultural factors can complicate, prolong, and 
frustrate negotiations. While there is substantial empirical evidence that negotiating 
tendencies differ by culture (see Adair et al., 2001; Graham et al., 1994), much of the 
information that is available to an expanding corps of international negotiators about 
negotiating behaviors in countries around the world is descriptive (Elashmawi, 2001; 
Foster, 1992; Gesteland, 1997; Moran and Stripp, 1991; Morrison et al., 1994; Salacuse, 
2003). Negotiators may find themselves relying on very basic lists of dos and don’ts (see 
CultureGrams, 2005; Morrison et al., 1994), which may or may not contain tips 
relevant to negotiating. Moreover, the items included in the lists are generally not 
comparable across countries. Empirical work that systematically compares variations 
across a range of countries is scarce (Metcalf and Bird, 2004). The conventional wisdom 
presented in Table 1, summarizes the type of information available to a negotiator for 
the four countries that are the subject of this study. What the table makes clear is the 
lack of information on some countries, the stereotypical nature of what is available, and 
the contradictions that exist – without explanation – between widely available sources. In 
this era of increased global cooperation, it is imperative that negotiators be equipped 
with a better understanding of the behaviors they might expect at the negotiating table. 
Negotiators need information about the negotiating tendencies they are likely to 
encounter in a given country and, because a growing cadre of negotiators conduct 
business in several, or even many, different countries, they also need access to a 
systematic comparison of negotiating tendencies across a wide range of countries. 
 
---------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
---------------------------------- 
 
A number of models that would permit comparisons between countries have been 
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proposed. These models capture the myriad influences on international negotiating 
behavior (see Berton et al., 1999; Cellich and Jain, 2004; Cohen, 1997; Ghauri, 2003; 
Salacuse, 1991; Weiss and Stripp, 1998) and can be classified according to the 
comparative, micro-behavioral (cross cultural) paradigm identified by Weiss (2004) 
in his review of the international negotiation literature. The micro-behavioral 
paradigm directs attention to the face-to-face interaction between negotiators, with 
particular interest in the orientations and behaviors of negotiators, as well as the effect of 
contextual factors. Streams of empirical research in this paradigm include, for 
example, the work of Graham and his associates (Graham, 1984; Graham and Lin, 
1987; Graham et al., 1988) on comparative negotiation, and Brett and associates (2000, 
2001) on intercultural negotiation. While shedding light on cultural differences in 
negotiating behaviors, these streams of empirical work were limited in focus to three 
or fewer negotiating tendencies or styles. 
 
A comprehensive framework having the potential to yield comparable information 
across countries on 12 negotiating tendencies or styles was proposed more than 20 years 
ago by Weiss and Stripp (1985). The framework was conceptual and the 12 dimensions 
in the framework were loosely defined, with considerable overlap among them. 
Moreover, the dimensions comprising the framework were not clearly linked to the body 
of negotiation and cross cultural research. The authors’ intent in developing the 
framework was to sensitize researchers and practitioners to possible culturally based 
differences in negotiation attitudes, behaviors, and contexts (Weiss and Stripp, 1998). At 
the time the model was developed, systematic comparative research on international 
business negotiations was rare. Perhaps for that reason, the framework received almost no 
attention and was never empirically tested. 
 
The goals of our work over the past several years have been (1) to ground the work 
in the relevant bodies of negotiation and cross cultural research that have been built 
up over the last two decades; (2) to remove conceptual ambiguity and to propose 
modifications in the original framework that would allow empirical testing; and (3) to 
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operationalize the dimensions in the model. As a result of our work, 12 dimensions have 
been substantially redefined and reinterpreted. In so doing, we conferred with Weiss to 
ensure that we had remained faithful to the aims and to the content of the original 
framework. Our reinterpretation of the framework (see Figure 1) is presented below as 
the Negotiation Orientations Framework. 
 
---------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
---------------------------------- 
 
While we have refined the conceptualframing of all  of the dimensions in the 
Negotiation Orientations Framework and are working to develop measures for all 12, 
at this point, we have operationalized four of the dimensions in the model. 
Consequently, the focus of this study is on the four dimensions that we have 
operationalized: Basic Concept of Negotiation, Most Significant Type of Issue, Basis 
of Trust, and Form of Agreement. The research reported in the remainder of this 
article (1) describes the development and validation of scales for each pole of the 
four dimensions listed, and (2) demonstrates how the resulting scales can be used to 
identify country differences in negotiation orientations. First, we present definitions 
for the four dimensions included in this study. Second, we describe how items for each 
dimension were generated. Third, we use data from samples drawn from four countries 
to select items based on factor analysis loadings and correlations. Fourth, we use 
resulting scales and indicators to look at differences in negotiation orientations across 
the four countries on the four dimensions. 
 
The Negotiation Orientations Framework: Defining the Dimensions 
Precise definitions provide the basis of good measurement and the means by which 
subsequent research findings can be compared and synthesized (Churchill, 1979). 
Developing precise definitions for each dimension and pole in the Weiss and Stripp 
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framework led us to an extensive review of the literature on negotiation, cross cultural 
psychology, and cross cultural communication. Refinements in the definition for all 
12 of the dimensions have been presented in previous work (Metcalf and Bird, 2003). In 
the interest of space, we limit the refinements presented below to the four dimensions on 
which we compare the four countries included in this study. 
 
Basic Concept of Negotiation (BCN): Distributive vs. Integrative 
Basic Concept of Negotiation refers to how each party views the negotiating process. 
Consistent with Walton and McKersie’s work (1965), we proposed a bipolar dimension, 
with the orientation that negotiators bring to the negotiating process being either distributive or 
integrative. The assumption underlying distributive bargaining strategies is that one party gains 
at the expense of the other the size of the pie is fixed. In contrast, the assumption underlying 
integrative bargaining strategies is that both parties place different values on the issues being 
negotiated and that each party can find effective trade-offs by conceding less important issues to 
gain on more important ones the size of the pie is not fixed (Bazerman and Neale, 1992). 
Integrative negotiation involves both cooperation to expand the pie and competition to divide the 
pie between the two parties (Adair and Brett, 2004). 
 
Distributive (BCN-D) 
Negotiators from countries that fit this profile believe that there will be one winner and 
one loser (Mintu-Wimsatt and Gassenheimer, 2000). Consequently, the negotiator’s 
goal is to establish dominance in the negotiation (Donohue and Ramesh, 1992). 
Negotiators take a hard-line approach, seeking to meet only their own goals or interests, 
in order to maximize the benefit for their side (Li and Labig, 1996). Negotiators assume 
their interests directly conflict with those of the other party (Bazerman and Neale, 
1992). As a result, negotiators demonstrate a strong concern for themselves and little 
concern for others. Their goal is to induce the other party to alter attitudes and positions, 
which may be accomplished either by using promises or threats (Graham and Mintu-
Wimsatt, 1997) or by remaining polite and neutral (DeMente, 1987). Their aspiration 
levels may be high and rigid, which makes them resistant to making concessions 
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(Chan, 1998). Alternatively, in order to exploit their position to the greatest extent, 
negotiators may continuously adapt their strategy based on the other party’s actions 
(DeMente, 1987). The atmosphere may be contentious or frustrating and a competitive 
outlook dominates, as negotiators focus on the need for the other party to concede 
(Gelfand et al., 2001). 
 
Integrative (BCN-I) 
Negotiators from countries that fit this profile believe that mutually beneficial 
solutions can be generated. Consequently, integrative negotiators take a problem-solving 
approach, where the focus is on exchanging information in order to identify the underlying 
issues and interests of both sides and to generate outcomes that benefit both parties. 
Negotiators adopting integrative behaviors attempt to understand the underlying issues 
and their relative importance to both parties. Their goal is to capitalize on the different 
interests of both parties so as to find effective trade-offs. Negotiators concede on less 
important issues in order to gain on more important ones (Bazerman and Neale, 1992). 
Negotiators not only share information about their own interests but also seek to obtain 
information about the other party’s interests. Through the process of exchanging 
information, both parties react to each other’s arguments and adjust their initial stances 
on the issues (Putnam and Holmer, 1992). Negotiators reach agreement not by 
compromise (giving in) but by employing creative problem-solving approaches to 
develop solutions that expand the size of the rewards available to everyone. 
 
Most Significant Type of Issue (MST): Task- vs. Relationship-based 
Most Significant Type of Issue refers to the types of issues negotiators spend more time 
discussing. Consistent with previous work (Pinkley, 1990), we proposed a bipolar 
dimension, with task- and relationship-based issues as the endpoints. Negotiators with a 
task frame focus on specific issues having to do with the project at hand, and place 
emphasis on exchanging information regarding various alternatives. Importantly, 
negotiators with a task frame view these issues as being external to the relationship 
(Gelfand et al., 2001). In contrast, negotiators with a relationship frame focus on the 
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relationship that exists between the two parties. Considerable time is spent on the process 
of getting to know the other party and on establishing rapport between members of 
negotiating teams (Simintiras and Thomas, 1998). 
 
Task (MST-T) 
Negotiators from countries where task issues are more important spend most of their time 
discussing specific operational details of the project, as opposed to broad objectives. They 
tend to negotiate a contract in an item-by-item way (Victor, 1992). Negotiators feel 
that it is important to come away with a clear understanding regarding the control, 
use, and division of resources (e.g. profits, management, ownership, and so forth). 
 
Relationship (MST-R) 
Negotiators from countries where relationship issues are more important spend most of 
their time engaging in activities that build trust and friendship between the members of 
each team, and discussing broad objectives (e.g. the intent of the parties to work together 
and mutual long-term interests). A good relationship must be established before task 
issues can be discussed. As the social relationship develops, task issues will be blended in 
and eventually resolved (Victor, 1992). 
 
Basis of Trust (BOT): External to the Parties vs. Internal to the Relationship 
Trust is one party’s belief that the other party will take action to honor agreements that 
have been reached (Wilson and Moller, 1991). In all countries, trust provides the 
foundation on which both parties to a negotiation can work together. However, 
negotiators from some countries trust that the other party will fulfill its obligations 
because there is a signed contract and the sanction of law to back it up, while 
negotiators from other countries trust that the other party will fulfill its obligations 
because of the relationship that exists between them. 
 
External to the Parties (BOT-E) 
Negotiators trust the other party because a contract has been negotiated and agreed 
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to, which can be litigated and enforced (Fukuyama, 1995). The legal system and 
governmental agencies are viewed as providing an adequate, reliable, and effective 
underpinning for commercial transactions. A partner will honor the terms of the contract 
because the legal system will impose sanctions otherwise. The written word is binding; 
a deal is a deal (Trompenaars, 1993). In this context, a trustworthy partner is simply one 
who complies with the law. 
 
Internal to the Relationship (BOT-I) 
Negotiators trust the other party because they have invested in a relationship that has 
been built up over time and they believe that the other party is committed to it. The 
relationship between the parties is what matters; the contract is simply a symbol of the 
bond between the parties who drafted it (Victor, 1992). Consequently, less emphasis is 
placed on detailed, written contracts. Negotiators expect that the other party will 
consider unique and changing circumstances over the life of the relationship. A 
trustworthy partner is one who strives to maintain the relationship, possibly by 
modifying an existing contract to reflect new developments (Trompenaars, 1993). 
 
Form of Agreement (FOA): Explicit Contract vs. Implicit Agreement 
This dimension refers to the preferred form of agreement between the parties: either 
formal written contracts or informal oral agreements. This bipolar dimension is strongly 
supported by the literature. Formal written contracts clearly specify desired partner 
actions, the degree to which both parties to the agreement will cooperate and conform to 
each other’s expectations, as well as the penalties that one party can extract should 
the other party fail to perform. On the other hand, informal agreements often consider 
the historical and social context of a relationship and acknowledge that the performance 
and enforcement of obligations are an outcome of mutual interest between parties 
(Frankel et al., 1996). 
 
Explicit Contract (FOA-EC) 
Negotiators favor and expect written, legally binding contracts (Weiss and Stripp, 1985). A 
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written contract records the agreement and definitively specifies what each party has 
agreed to do (Trompenaars, 1993). Consequently, negotiators believe that written 
agreements provide the stability that allows their organization to make investments and 
minimize the risk of business loss (Frankel et al., 1996). 
 
Implicit Agreement (FOA-IA) 
Negotiators favor broad or vague language in a contract because they feel that definitive 
contract terms are too rigid to allow a good working relationship to evolve. Particularly 
with new relationships, negotiators may feel that it is impossible to anticipate and 
document every conceivable contingency. They may also believe that contracts inhibit 
the parties from exploring unexpected or unusual opportunities for improvement and 
success. Negotiators view the contract as a rough guideline, not because they want to 
evade responsibility, but because the relationship, not the contract, is primary 
(Trompenaars, 1993). In some cases, an oral contract may suffice. 
 
With the dimensions defined in terms of extant bodies of research, we sought to develop 
measurement scales that could be used to assess tendencies in negotiating behaviors 
across countries. In the next section we describe how items for each dimension were 
generated, and use data from samples drawn from four countries to select items based on 
factor analysis loadings and correlations. 
 
Methodology Item Generation 
Through an extensive review of the literature (a subset has been included earlier), which 
included a review of items used in previous studies to assess elements of cross cultural 
negotiating behavior and related concepts (Adair et  al . ,  2001; Adler et  al . ,  1992; 
Hampden-Turner and Trompenaars, 2000; Salacuse, 1998; Triandis, 1995), descriptions 
of behaviors exemplifying each pole of each dimension were identified. These 
descriptions of negotiating behaviors were converted to statements, yielding 29-nine 
items, which were scored by respondents on a 5-point Likert scale, with endpoints 
‘strongly agree’ and ‘strongly disagree’. Of the 29 items, 12 were intended to measure 
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Basic Concept of Negotiation (BCN), six each were intended to measure Most 
Significant Type of Issue (MST) and Basis of Trust (BOT), and five items were 
intended to measure Form of Agreement (FOA). 
 
Following the literature, items for the distributive pole of Basic Concept of Negotiation 
(BCN-D) incorporated such ideas as the following: a win–lose perspective, the 
assumption that one party’s interests would directly conflict with those of the other 
party, an interest in seeking dominance over the other party, and a hard-line approach. 
Items for the integrative pole of Basic Concept of Negotiation (BCN-I) focused on 
information sharing, making trade-offs, and mutually beneficial outcomes. The task 
pole of Most Significant Type of Issue (MST-T) was represented by items pertaining 
to a focus on details, hammering out operational issues, and negotiating contracts in an 
item-by-item fashion. The relationship pole of Most Significant Type of Issue (MST-
R) was represented by items that captured the importance of establishing a relationship, 
taking a long-term perspective, and focusing on broad objectives. Basis of Trust – 
External (BOT-E) included items that focused on the written word as binding, as well as 
basing trust on a signed contract. On the other hand, Basis of Trust – Internal (BOT-I) 
focused on contracts as flexible instruments and trusting the other party because a 
relationship had developed between them. Finally, the items representing Form of 
Agreement – Explicit Contract (FOA-EC) focused on the expectation of generating a 
legally binding contract and a dependence on written agreements that specified each 
party’s obligations. The items representing Form of Agreement – Implicit Agreement 
(FOA-IA) focused on general, loosely structured contracts, and whether or not an oral 
contract was satisfactory. The 29 items representing these four dimensions comprised 
our research instrument, the Negotiation Orientations Inventory (NOI). 
 
Countries 
It was important to determine whether or not scales could be developed that were 
meaningful to people not only in the United States, where the Weiss and Stripp 
framework was developed, but also to people in substantially different nations. With the 
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intent of pushing out the range of variation between cultures, the four countries 
selected for consideration in this study were drawn from different cultural clusters. 
Ronen and Shenkar (1985) originally proposed the notion of cultural clusters and, 
more recently, the GLOBE research project (House et al., 2004) adopted a similar 
cluster approach. The premise underlying the notion of cultural clusters is that, 
because of reasons of geographic proximity, common language and historical 
relatedness, similarities in values and beliefs may be found among a group of national 
cultures. Four cultural clusters are represented in this study: Finland is classified in 
the Nordic/Scandinavian cluster; Turkey in the Near Eastern/Middle Eastern cluster; 
Mexico in the Latin American cluster; and the USA in the Anglo cluster (House et 
al., 2004; Ronen and Shenkar, 1985). 
 
Survey Instrument 
The English-language NOI was translated into Finnish, Mexican Spanish, and 
Turkish by research colleagues in Finland, Mexico, and Turkey, respectively. To 
ensure that NOI items had been translated accurately, each translation was compared 
with the original English-language version by bilingual scholars familiar with cross 
cultural negotiation concepts. The NOI items were also reviewed to ensure that the 
negotiation concepts and behaviors they represented could be appropriately applied in 
the Finnish, Mexican, and Turkish business environments. 
 
Participants 
A sample of business people and university students with business experience was drawn 
from executive MBA programs in Finland, Mexico, Turkey, and the USA. Data were 
collected from 147 men and women from Finland, 327 from Turkey, 192 from 
Mexico and 327 from the USA. Chi square test results show demographic differences 
between the samples. Finnish and Indian respondents were predominantly male, whereas 
respondents from the other three countries were more evenly divided. US and Indian 
respondents were younger than Mexican and Turkish respondents. Indian 
respondents were better educated than the respondents from the other four countries. 
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Finally, 45% of the Indian sample reported having either middle management or top-
level executive experience, with 39% for Mexico, 28% for Turkey,  14% for  the  US,  
and 12% for  Finland. Differing demographic profiles across countries is not uncommon 
in multicountry studies involving multiple countries and multiple investigators (see the 
GLOBE project). In our analyses, national differences in negotiation orientations 
remained after controlling for demographic differences. 
 
Item Analyses 
Pan-cultural and within-culture factor analyses and correlation analyses were used: (1) to 
evaluate whether the items designed to represent each construct actually did so, and (2) to 
improve the scales. Two criteria for determining whether or not one of the intended 
scales could be constructed for a given country were (1) that a sufficient number of the 
intended items loaded on the factor for which they were designed, and (2) that a scale with 
reliability (or an alpha) of over .60 could be produced in each country. Additional 
considerations were item clarity and face validity. The majority of our scales simply did 
not work as intended. In developing items, we followed the literature and carefully 
included items that reflected both poles of a dimension. The assumption was that we 
could reverse code items representing the opposing end of a given pole and include 
them in a scale. Doing so resulted in reliabilities well below the criterion we had set. 
This led us to examine the possibility that, while the Weiss and Stripp model suggested 
that the ends of a dimension (e.g. explicit contract versus implicit agreement) could be 
viewed as polar opposites, in practice, people may not think of them as such (e.g. 
explicitness and implicitness are independent constructs). Others (see Oyserman et al., 
2002; Weiss, 2004) have come to similar conclusions – constructs that the negotiation 
literature treats as bipolar appear to be better understood as distinct dimensions. As 
Table 2 indicates, most scales suggested in theory to represent polar opposites in fact 
have low negative or non-significant correlations. 
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---------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
---------------------------------- 
 
Consequently, we began to think in terms of eight negotiating tendencies, rather than 
four dimensions each with two poles. While reliabilities improved substantially, many 
were still modest. A search for the cause led us to rethink some concepts, such as Most 
Significant Type of Issue, which really refers to a cluster of different but related 
tendencies – the tendency to focus on aspects of the deal is different from the tendency 
to negotiate contracts in an item-by-item fashion. Most Significant Type of Issue is a 
multidimensional construct. As a result, items that assessed different aspects of Most 
Significant Type of Issue could not be combined to form a single MST scale. 
 
As shown in Appendix 1, we have single item measures for MST-T, MST-R, BOT-E, 
BOT-I, and FOA-IA. We are confident that these single item measures faithfully 
capture the essence of the respective constructs. We have multiple-item scales that 
measure the FOA-E, BCN-D, and BCN-I (see Appendix 1). 
 
Preliminary results suggest that there are similarities in the three scales that we retained 
across countries, although reliabilities are typically best for the US, where the Weiss 
and Stripp model was developed. In the following sections, we use the scales that we 
found to be the most reliable and also several single-item indicators to look at differences 
in negotiation orientations across the four countries on the four dimensions: Basic 
Concept of Negotiation, Most Significant Type of Issue, Basis of Trust, and Form of 
Agreement. As noted in the discussion, we also recognize that the scale development 
analyses suggest that the basic concepts on which international negotiation theory rests 
need to be rethought, and that new items need to be prepared to represent the revised 
theory. 
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Results 
 
Country Comparisons 
To test whether or not the resulting scales and items could identify differences in negotiating 
orientations, we conducted a MANOVA analysis predicting the full set of measures. 
The results were significant, indicating that country differences in negotiating 
tendencies do exist. Mean scores for each country on each of the eight negotiating 
tendencies are reported in Table 3. To test for country differences individually 
across each of the eight negotiating tendencies, we used Tukey’s Honestly Significant 
Difference (HSD) test, which is the most powerful post hoc multiple comparison test for 
evaluating a large number of pairs of means (Winer et al., 1991). Tukey’s HSD results 
are also presented in Table 3. Chi square test results show significant differences in 
response distributions across all four countries on all negotiating tendencies. As we 
report the results, differences in response distributions will be discussed where they add 
interesting insight. 
 
The Negotiation Orientations Inventory scales and items appear to differentiate 
between the four countries represented in this study. We focus first on results for each 
negotiating orientation, and then move on to a consideration of the broader findings. 
 
Basic Concept of Negotiation – Distributive (BCN-D) 
As noted, the assumption underlying distributive bargaining strategies is that one party 
gains at the expense of the other – the size of the pie is fixed. Mean scores for Turkey and 
Mexico show respondents from these countries tending toward the ‘agree’ side of this 
scale, indicating a distributive basic concept of negotiation. Significant differences in 
mean scores for this negotiating orientation were observed between Turkey and the other 
countries included in the study (Table 3), and also between Mexico and the other countries. 
Turkish respondents showed a significantly greater tendency toward a distributive 
orientation toward negotiation – 82% agreed with statements comprising the scale – 
than respondents from the other three countries, with Finnish and US respondents 
16 
 
showing the weakest tendency toward this orientation. 
 
Basic Concept of Negotiation – Integrative (BCN-I) 
The assumption underlying integrative bargaining strategies is that, because both parties 
place different values on the issues being negotiated, effective trade-offs can be reached 
by conceding on less important issues to gain on more important ones – the size of the 
pie is not fixed. Mean scores for all four countries indicate a tendency for respondents to 
view positively an integrative basic concept of negotiation. Eighty percent of Turks 
are on the agreement side of this scale, which is surprising given their greater tendency 
toward a distributive orientation. Despite the general tendency of respondents from all 
countries toward an integrative basic concept of negotiation, this negotiating orientation 
produced statistically different means between all pairs of countries, except for 
Finland–Mexico (Table 3). Finnish and Mexican respondents showed the greatest 
tendency toward an integrative orientation, with 99% of the Finns and 97% of the 
Mexicans agreeing with the statements comprising the scale. 
 
---------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
---------------------------------- 
 
Most Significant Type of Issue – Task-related (MST-T) 
Negotiators with a task frame focus on specific issues having to do with the project at 
hand, and view these issues as being external to the relationship. Although the Finns 
disagreed (74%) that it was most important to focus on the details, the mean scores for 
the other countries indicate general agreement with this statement. With that said, 
significant differences in mean scores on this item (see Appendix 1) were observed 
between all pairs of countries except Turkey–USA (Table 3). Over half of the 
Turkish and US respondents agreed that focusing on the details was most important. 
The Mexican response was mixed, with 36% agreeing, 36% at neither, and 28% 
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disagreeing that it was most important to focus on the details. 
 
Most Significant Type of Issue – Relationship-based (MST-R) 
Negotiators with a relationship frame focus on the relationship that exists between the 
two parties. Interestingly, given the task- based orientation of US and Turkish 
respondents, mean scores for all four countries agree that it is important to build trust 
and friendship with members of the opposing team. Significant differences in mean 
scores were observed between Turkey and all the other countries in the study, with 
Turks the least likely to agree that it is important to build trust and friendship (Table 
3). 
 
Basis of Trust – External (BOT-E) 
Negotiators with this frame of reference trust that the other party will fulfill its 
obligations because there is a signed contract and the sanction of law to back it up. 
Mean scores for all four countries indicate that respondents trust the other party 
because a contract has been negotiated and agreed on (Table 3). Surprisingly high 
percentages of Mexican (58%) and Turkish respondents (46%) agreed with the 
statement – with respondents from both countries showing a stronger tendency to 
agree than respondents from the United States (43%). In fact, US respondents showed the 
strongest tendency to disagree with this statement (27%) versus 17% for each of the other 
three countries. 
 
Basis of Trust – Internal (BOT-I) 
Negotiators whose basis of trust is internal, trust that the other party will fulfill its 
obligations because of the relationship that exists between them. Mean scores for 
Finland, Mexico, and the United States show a clear orientation toward trust based on 
relationships. Seventy-one percent of Finnish respondents agreed with the statement ‘I 
trust the other party because we have developed a relationship’. On the other hand, 
only 29% of Turkish respondents agreed with the statement. Significant differences in 
mean scores were observed between Turkey and all the other countries (Table 3). 
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Form of Agreement – Explicit Contract (FOA-EC) 
Negotiators with this frame of reference favor and expect written contracts. Mean scores 
for all four countries indicate a preference for a legally binding written agreement, with 
more than 75% of the respondents in each country either agreeing or strongly agreeing. 
Percentages of respondents on the agreement end of this scale were 83% (US), 82% 
(Finland), 80% (Mexico), and 78% (Turkey). The only pair of countries for which 
this scale produced a significant difference in means was Finland–Turkey, with the 
Finns showing the stronger preference for a contract (Table 3). 
 
Form of Agreement – Implicit Agreement (FOA-IA) 
Negotiators that favor implicit agreements acknowledge that the performance and 
enforcement of obligations are an outcome of mutual interest between parties the 
relationship rather than the contract is primary. Mexicans and Turks showed the 
strongest tendency to favor implicit agreements (Table 3), preferring broad contracts 
that allow good working relationships to evolve. Finns showed the strongest tendency 
to disagree (51 %) with this orientation. Implicit agreement produced significant 
differences in mean scores for all pairs of countries except Finland–USA. 
 
Discussion and Implications 
Our objectives for this study were twofold. First, we sought to operationalize the 
dimensions in the model and to gather data that would allow comparisons between 
countries. Second, our intent was to establish the utility of the framework in 
identifying country differences across four countries: Finland, Mexico, Turkey, and 
the United States. 
 
Scale Development 
In general, our efforts to develop scales reflecting four of the dimensions in the 
Negotiation Orientations Framework were not successful; however, the lack of success 
provides direction for further measure development. Our attempt to develop scales for 
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four dimensions suggests that the notion of bipolar negotiation concepts needs to be 
revised in two ways. One is that we should think in terms of eight separate constructs, 
rather than four bipolar dimensions, each of which appears likely to have multiple sub-
dimensions. That suggests a very different scale development approach from the one we 
had anticipated. It also suggests that understanding intercultural negotiation is 
considerably more complex than is appreciated in the current intercultural negotiation 
literature. Osland and Bird (2000) noted that most cross cultural research looks at cultural 
dimensions in a bipolar fashion, resulting in what they call ‘sophisticated stereotyping’ 
that does not capture the complexity within cultures and the underlying socioeconomic 
and political contexts. 
 
Country Differences 
We did, indeed, find significant differences in negotiation orientations between Finland, 
Mexico, Turkey, and the United States. For four of the negotiation orientations, we found 
significant differences in mean scores for five of the six paired comparisons, as shown in 
Table 3. Chi square test results indicate significantly different patterns of response for 
all four countries on all negotiating tendencies. Although each country presented a 
unique pattern of negotiation orientations, not surprisingly, countries were found to be 
similar on some dimensions. For example, with the exception of Finland–Turkey, no 
significant differences were found between pairs of countries on Form of Agreement– 
Explicit Contract. These similarities and differences present the opportunity to explore 
further interesting findings. 
 
In Table 4, we present scores for each of the four countries on Hofstede’s (2001) four 
work-related dimensions of national power distance (PDI), uncertainty avoidance (UAI), 
individualism–collectivism (IDV), and masculinity–femininity (MAS). Additionally, 
we report ‘as is’ and ‘should be’ scores from the GLOBE project (House et al., 2004) 
for assertiveness. In the GLOBE study, assertiveness is linked to competition, dominance, 
and toughness, whereas non-assertiveness is linked to a cooperative, submissive, egalitarian 
outlook. ‘As is’ scores are descriptive of current conditions, whereas ‘should be’ scores 
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reflect preferred conditions. Hofstede’s work and the GLOBE findings provide insight 
into the negotiation orientations demonstrated by respondents in our study. 
 
---------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
---------------------------------- 
 
Basic Concept of Negotiation – Distributive and Integrative 
Respondents from all countries show a strong orientation toward an integrative basic 
concept of negotiation. Additionally, sizeable percentages of respondents from all 
four countries also demonstrate a distributive basic concept of negotiation, ranging from 
32% (Finland) to 82% (Turkey). These results clearly indicate that Basic Concept of 
Negotiation is not a bipolar dimension. 
 
That Finns show an integrative basic concept of negotiation is not surprising. Lewis 
(2004) notes that Finns seek early integration of their ideas in the planning of a project. 
Hofstede’s (2001) work, showing the tendency for feminine cultures toward mutually 
beneficial outcomes, also supports the Finnish integrative orientation; Finland’s score on 
MAS (Table 4) is the lowest of the four countries. Likewise, GLOBE findings (House 
et al., 2004) are consistent with our results, which show a relatively low percentage 
of Finns with a distributive basic concept of negotiation. ‘As is’ scores (Table 4) 
on assertiveness for Finland are the lowest of any of the four countries (higher scores 
indicate assertiveness). 
 
The dual Turkish orientation (both distributive and integrative) on basic concept of 
negotiation is also consistent with other research findings. Turkey’s MAS score 
(Table 4) is relatively low (Hofstede, 2001), which supports the Turkish integrative 
orientation. Supporting the Turkish distributive orientation are the relatively high ‘as 
is’ scores (Table 4) on assertiveness (House et al., 2004). 
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Conventional wisdom indicates that Mexicans prefer win–win solutions – that is, an 
integrative basic concept of negotiation. So it is somewhat surprising that over half of 
Mexican respondents are also oriented toward a distributive, or win–lose, basic concept of 
negotiation. Both Hofstede (2001) and the GLOBE project (House et al., 2004) report 
results that are consistent with the Mexican orientation toward a distributive basic 
concept of negotiation. Mexico’s MAS score is relatively high and this country’s 
scores on assertiveness are also relatively high (Table 4). 
 
As with Mexico, conventional wisdom for the United States suggests that negotiators 
seek mutual  gains whenever possible. Negotiation approaches promoted heavily 
over the last decade in the United States emphasize a win–win orientation toward 
negotiation (see Bazerman and Neale, 1992; Fisher and Ury, 1991). Consistent with 
conventional wisdom, US respondents were oriented toward an integrative basic 
concept of negotiation. Finally, slightly more than one-third of US respondents 
showed a distributive orientation toward basic concept of negotiation, which is also 
supported both by the GLOBE project findings (House et al., 2004) on assertiveness 
(Table 4) and by the relatively high score for the United States on MAS (Hofstede, 2001). 
 
Findings for all four countries suggest that negotiators should neither view the negotiation 
process as adversarial, nor should they look at it as a forum for making unilateral 
concessions. While negotiators from all four countries are oriented toward win–
win, the sizeable percentage of respondents in all countries, particularly Turkey, with a 
win– lose orientation suggests that negotiators from other countries need to explore the 
attitudes of the specific parties with whom they are negotiating. This, of course, is 
prudent advice in all negotiation settings. 
 
The preceding implication, as well as those for the other negotiation orientations, is 
presented in Table 5. Our findings suggest that negotiators should prepare differently 
from what the ‘conventional wisdom’ regarding negotiation orientations in these four 
22 
 
countries might suggest (refer again to Table 1). Table 5 presents a number of practical 
‘dos’ and ‘don’ts’ that negotiators can take away from our empirical findings. 
 
---------------------------------- 
Insert Table 5 about here 
---------------------------------- 
 
Most Significant Type of Issue – Task-related and Relationship-based 
Respondents from all countries agreed that it was important to build trust and friendship 
with members of the other negotiating team. In addition, a majority of US and 
Turkish respondents agreed that it was most important to focus on details – a task 
orientation. Our findings are consistent with Borgatta et al. (1954), whose work suggests 
that task and relationship are independent qualities. On the other hand, the orientation 
of respondents from each of the four countries on both dimensions is surprising given the 
work of others (see Hofstede, 2001), which indicates that, in collectivist cultures, 
relationships must be established between two parties before they can do any 
business, and that personal relationships prevail over task considerations. Additionally, 
Hofstede’s (2001) work indicates that task prevails over personal relationships in 
individualist societies. Consequently, one would expect US and Finnish respondents 
to be more task oriented, with Turkish and Mexican respondents being more 
relationship oriented (Table 4). Our findings show a greater percentage of Finnish 
respondents as having the strongest relationship orientation, with 93% of in 
agreement, and the weakest task orientation, with 18% of respondents in agreement.  
In contrast, Turkish respondents had the weakest relationship orientation (61% in 
agreement) and one of the strongest task orientations (51 % in agreement). 
 
Our findings suggest that negotiators should build rapport with Finns by discussing the 
general themes and principles behind the negotiations before getting into the details of the 
project. In addition, negotiators should be prepared to discuss details of a project 
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with Turks. 
 
Basis of Trust – External and Internal 
Conventional wisdom suggests that trust in the United States is based on contracts rather 
than on relationships, and that the opposite is true for Mexicans. Given this, one would 
expect US respondents to agree strongly with the statement ‘I trust the other party 
because a contract has been negotiated and agreed on’, and Mexican respondents to 
disagree. Our results demonstrate that this was not the case. While US respondents did 
base trust on a negotiated and agreed-on contract, so did Mexican respondents – in fact, 
significantly more so. Moreover, our findings indicate no significant difference between 
the US and the Mexican response to the statement ‘I trust the other party because we 
have developed a relationship’. Fifty-six percent of US respondents and 60% of 
Mexican respondents agreed with this statement. The relationship orientation of US 
respondents may reflect a growing emphasis in the United States on developing and 
maintaining long-term relationships with suppliers and customers. Although contracts 
are important, close relationships facilitate business processes, such as supply chain 
management and JIT manufacturing, that are the hallmark of today’s industry leaders. 
 
The Turkish response was also surprising, given the relationship orientation commonly 
cited in negotiation guides (see Morrison et al., 1994). Only 28% of Turks place trust 
in another party on the basis of a relationship that has been developed. Moreover, 
fewer than half (46%) of the Turkish respondents agreed that trust in another party is 
based on a contract. Taken together, these findings point to possible difficulties Turks 
may have in establishing trust with others. Hofstede (2001) links low interpersonal 
trust with collectivism, which appears paradoxical until one distinguishes between in-
groups and out-groups. Of the four countries, Turkey has one of the lowest scores on 
Individualism (Table 4). The tendency in collectivist cultures is to trust only ‘one of 
us’ (Hofstede, 2001). Data from the most recent world values survey (Inglehart et al., 
2004) confirm Turks’ distrust of out-groups. Turks demonstrate a high degree of trust 
for people of their own nationality (ranking sixth of the countries included in the 
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survey), but a very low degree of trust for others (ranking last or close to it). Other 
work (Hofstede, 2001) identifies a relationship between high power distance and low 
‘faith in people’ – Turkey’s score on PDI is relatively high (Table 4). For these reasons, it 
may be difficult for Turkish negotiators to trust others – with or without contracts or 
relationships. 
 
Finns base trust both on contracts (70%) and on relationships (71 %), as do a majority of 
Mexicans (58% and 60%). GLOBE findings (House et al., 2004) indicate relatively 
high ‘as is’ scores for both Finns (5.02) and Mexicans (4.18) with respect to spelling out 
instructions and requirements in detail. That Mexicans base trust on relationships is not 
surprising, given Mexico’s low IDV score (Table 4). In negotiations, Finnish 
expectations are that the other party will be faithful and solid (Lewis, 2004), which may 
provide insight into the Finnish orientation toward relationships as a basis for trust. 
 
These findings suggest that negotiators should both build relationships and conclude 
contracts with negotiators from the four countries included in this study. 
Conventional wisdom about Mexicans and Turks and their reliance on relationships, 
rather than contracts, may be misleading – our findings do not support this tendency. 
 
Form of Agreement – Explicit Contract and Implicit Agreement 
Respondents from all countries expect and depend on written agreements to outline and 
enforce the commitments between the two parties. In addition, respondents from all 
countries also show a preference, to some extent, for broad contracts that allow for a 
good working relationship to evolve. These findings are consistent with neither 
conventional wisdom nor research-based findings. Hofstede (2001) notes that things 
that are self-evident in collectivist cultures must be stated explicitly in individualist 
cultures. Also noted is that collectivist cultures rely on relationships. Based on IDV 
scores (Table 4), one would expect businesspeople from the United States and Finland 
to rely on contracts to enforce commitments, and businesspeople from Turkey and 
Mexico to rely on the relationship between the two parties instead of a contract. This 
25 
 
is not the case. 
 
Supporting the importance of clearly spelled out obligations in Mexico and Turkey 
are ‘should be’ scores for these countries in the GLOBE project (House et al., 2004). 
Additionally, Lewis (2004) sheds light on the Finnish orientation toward 
relationship, indicating that Finns simply expect the other party to adhere to 
mutually agreed-on obligations. While on the surface it may be surprising that US 
respondents were not as contract-oriented as conventional wisdom might indicate, our 
findings may reflect a shift in US orientation brought about by continuous and specific 
criticisms of US negotiators during the 1980s and 1990s – which said they were too 
focused on pushing the contract to the detriment of social relationships. Researchers 
have called for businesspeople to be ‘cross pollinators’ and ‘fertilizers’ that span 
different cultural environments (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1992). The explosion in global 
trade over the past decade and the diffusion of best business practices across the globe 
may have simultaneously increased the relationship sensitivities of US negotiators, 
and increased the contract sensitivities of negotiators in countries such as Mexico and 
Turkey, which have traditionally relied more heavily on relationships as a mechanism for 
compliance. 
 
A clear implication of this finding is that negotiators should realize that the goals of a 
signed contract and of building a relationship are not necessarily mutually exclusive, 
and that the achievement of one can lead to the other. Also, as business practices change 
over time as a result of global diffusion, one should be wary of the conventional 
thinking that negotiators from the United States are contract-oriented and those 
from Mexico and Turkey are relationship-oriented. 
 
Next Steps 
One of the more interesting findings of our study is not about cultural differences in 
negotiation; rather it is about how the field has historically conceptualized possible 
differences. Our results imply that some dimensions typically presented as bipolar 
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and one-dimensional are actually multifaceted. In the example noted earlier, Most 
Significant Type of Issue is not a one-dimensional construct – instead, it refers to a 
cluster of different but related tendencies. This suggests the need to ask colleagues in 
nations very different from the United States to propose variants on the constructs in the 
Weiss and Stripp model and, further, to propose additional constructs. Similarly, it 
suggests that we should also ask these colleagues to generate items reflecting each 
construct in their own language, and to provide translations into English. 
Our study has several limitations. We had single-item scales for five constructs, and for 
the three other constructs our reliability scores were modest. In the future, qualitative 
research must be conducted with negotiation professionals to explore the possibility of two 
separate dimensions for each of the original bipolar dimensions and multiple items 
generated for these separate dimensions. Also, we measured the orientations that 
businesspeople bring to a negotiation, without differentiating between domestic and 
international contexts. We acknowledge that respondents’ negotiating styles may vary 
depending on whether their counterparts are from the same country or from another 
country. Another limitation is the use of a ‘pseudo-etic’ approach (Triandis and Marin 
1983), where we used items developed in the United States to explore tendencies in 
other cultures. As we noted earlier, future work will need to focus on generating items 
in other countries as well. 
 
Conclusion 
In summary, the results reveal that constructs frequently presented as bipolar may not be. 
Rather than demonstrating an orientation toward one pole of a continuum to the 
exclusion of the other, respondents from all four countries were often oriented toward 
both. Similar to the results of individual-level research about individualism and 
collectivism (Oyserman et al., 2002), constructs that the negotiation literature treats 
as bipolar appear to be better understood as distinct dimensions. 
 
The results also demonstrate that use of a dimensional framework allows for meaningful 
cross-national comparison. Negotiators can use the dimensions in a framework to 
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systematically identify possible areas of tension, thereby making it possible to 
appropriately adjust their expectations and negotiation practices accordingly. 
Although the findings of this study are limited to four countries, because these 
countries are drawn from four different cultural clusters, they point to the likelihood of 
wider generalizability. Second, negotiators can use a framework to develop insight into 
their own orientations. Using basis of trust as an example, a negotiator who is oriented 
toward contracts and  relationships, develops a more fine-grained self-awareness of 
his or her style. It is no longer acceptable, accurate, or useful – if it ever was – for a US 
negotiator to expect a Mexican counterpart to be relationship-oriented, or a US 
counterpart to be contract-oriented. Our findings point to the inherent inaccuracy of 
what Osland and Bird (2000) have referred to as ‘sophisticated stereotyping’. If it is 
trite to note that international negotiations are highly complex affairs, then it should 
not come as a surprise to find that the negotiators themselves are similarly complex. 
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Figure 1 
The negotiation orientations framework 
Dimensions 
1. Basic Concept of Negotiation Distributive Integrative 
2. Most Significant Type of Issue Task-based Relationship-based 
3. Selection of Negotiators Abilities Status 
4. Influence of Individual Aspirations Individualist Collectivist 
5. Internal Decision-making Process Independent Consensus 
6. Orientation Toward Time Monochronic Polychronic 
7. Risk-taking Propensity Risk-averse Risk-tolerant 
8. Basis of Trust External to the parties Internal to the parties 
9. Concern with Protocol Formal Informal 
10. Style of Communication Low-context High-context 
11. Nature of Persuasion Factual-inductive Affective 
12. Form of Agreement Explicit Implicit 
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Table 1 
Conventional wisdom about negotiation in four countries* 
Dimension Finland Mexico Turkey United States 
Basic Concept 
of Negotiation: 
Distributive or 
Integrative 
Finns seek 
cooperative 
solutions at 
early stages and 
are intransigent 
once positions 
are taken. 
Mexicans have 
a win-win 
attitude. 
 Look for 
mutual gains, 
whenever 
possible. 
Most 
Significant 
Type of Issue: 
Task-Related or 
Relationship-
based 
Finns have a 
task 
orientation. 
Mexicans are 
relationship 
oriented. 
Establish 
relationships 
before 
negotiating. 
Establish 
rapport quickly, 
then ‘get down 
to business’. 
Basis of Trust: 
External or 
Internal 
Finns do not 
trust words. 
Trust is based 
on personal 
relationships. 
 Heavy reliance 
on the legal 
system.  
Lawyers may 
be involved 
from start to 
finish. 
Form of 
Agreement: 
Explicit 
Contract or 
Implicit 
Contract 
Agreements are 
adhered to and 
relied upon. 
Statements are 
promises. 
Words are not a 
binding 
commitment to 
action. 
Relationships 
ensure follow-
through. 
 Emphasize the 
contract and the 
fine points of 
an agreement. 
30 
 
* These recommendations are drawn from a variety of sources, including Business 
Mexico (2002); CultureGrams  (2005); Elashmawi (2001); Fisher and Ury (1991); Hall 
and Hall (1990); Hampden-Turner and Trompenaars (2000); Investor’s Business Daily 
(2004); Kras (1989); Lewis (2004); Moran and Stripp (1991); and Morrison et al. 
(1994). 
 
31 
 
Table 2 
Scale and item correlations 
 BCN-D BCN-I MST-T MST-R BOT-E BOT-I FOA-EC FOA-IA 
BCN-D 1 -.334* .232* -.185* -.021 -.160* .073* .057 
BCN-I  1 -.092* .349* .153* .284* .090* .075* 
MST-T   1 -.097* -.032 -.109* .066* .044 
MST-R    1 .138* .311* .078* .040 
BOT-E     1 .398* .181* .081* 
BOT-I      1 .057 .180* 
FOA-EC       1 -.066* 
FOA-IA        1 
*Significant at p = .05. 
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Table 3 
Negotiating tendency means, standard deviations and Tukey’s HSD for Finland, Mexico, Turkey, and the USA 
 Means and standard deviations Tukey’s HSD 
Negotiation Tendencies Fin Mex Turk USA 
Fin 
Mex 
Fin 
Turk 
Fin 
USA 
Mex 
Turk 
Mex 
USA 
Turk 
USA 
1. Basic Concept of Negotiation (BCN)           
Distributive 3.311 2.78 2.19 3.11 +2  + NS + + + 
 (0.914) (0.808) (0.764) (0.802)       
Integrative 1.47 1.58 2.28 1.77 NS + + + + + 
 (0.473) (0.548) (0.728) (0.594)       
2.  Most Significant Type of Issue (MST)           
Task-related 3.70 2.91 2.60 2.54 + + + + + NS 
Details (0.917) (1.082) (1.090) (0.981)       
Relationship-based: Trust and Friendship 1.56 1.79 2.30 2.01 NS + + + NS + 
 (0.768) (0.826) (1.008) (0.867)       
3.  Basis of Trust (BOT)           
External 2.36 2.48 2.67 2.83 NS + + NS + NS 
           
Internal 2.29 2.43 3.04 2.56 NS + + + NS + 
 (0.991) (0.897) (0.874) (0.912)       
4.  Form of Agreement (FOA)           
Explicit Contract 1.98 2.14 2.19 2.15 NS + NS NS NS NS 
 (0.849) (0.810) (0.751) (0.680)       
Implicit Agreement 3.10 2.40 2.80 3.06 + + NS + + + 
 (1.254) (1.015) (1.048) (0.927)       
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1Scale: 1 = strongly agree, 5 = strongly disagree 
2Significant difference, p  <.05. 
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Table 4 
Selected Hofstede (2001) and GLOBE Project findings 
 Hofstede GLOBE: Assertiveness 
 MAS IDV PDI UAI ‘As Is’ ‘Should Be’ 
Finland 26 63 33 59 3.81 3.68 
Mexico 69 30 81 82 4.45 3.79 
Turkey 45 37 66 85 4.53 2.66 
USA 62 91 40 46 4.55 4.32 
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Table 5 
Cultural tendencies in negotiation: implications for preparation and behavior 
Dimension Do Do not 
Basic Concept of 
Negotiation: Distributive or 
Integrative 
Acquire knowledge about 
general attitudes of 
individual negotiators. 
Turks are as likely to be 
distributive as integrative. 
Mexicans may also be 
distributive. 
Assume that an integrative 
approach will be appealing. 
When Turks or Mexicans 
adopt a distributive attitude, 
emphasize your concessions 
and their gains. 
Most Significant Type of 
Issue:  
Task-Related or 
Relationship-based 
Build rapport with Finns by 
laying out the general 
themes and principles 
behind the negotiations. 
Begin negotiations with 
Finns by discussing details 
of the project. 
Basis of Trust: External or 
Internal 
Establish relationships with 
Finnish negotiators. 
Assume that Mexican and 
Turkish negotiators are not 
focused on concluding a 
contract. 
Form of Agreement: Negotiate specific contract 
terms in Mexico and Turkey 
Expect that broad or vague 
language in a contract will 
be acceptable to most 
negotiators in Finland, 
Mexico, Turkey, and the 
US. 
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Appendix 1 
Scales for Four Negotiating Tendencies 
Dimension Scale I tems Reliabil i t ies 
Basic Concept of Negotiation 
Distributive (BCN-D) 
BCN1: In dealing with negotiations, I believe 
that there will be a winner and a loser. 
BCN3: When negotiating, it’s important for 
my team to establish dominance over the other 
party. 
BCN4: It is important to me that my 
negotiating team comes away with the better 
deal. 
Pan-cultural:     .68 
Finland:            .65 
Mexico:           .56 
Turkey:           .58 
USA:              .70 
Basic Concept of Negotiation 
Integrative (BCN-I) 
BCN5: In negotiations, I believe that mutually 
beneficial solutions can be reached. 
BCN11: When negotiating, I seek information 
about the other party’s needs so that we can 
achieve a mutually beneficial outcome. 
BCN12: When negotiating, I provide 
information about my own organization’s 
interests so that we can achieve a mutually 
beneficial outcome. 
Pan-cultural:     .68 
Finland:            .50 
Mexico:           .56 
Turkey:           .57 
USA:              .70 
Most Significant Type of Issue 
Task-related (MST-T) 
MST7: When negotiating,  i t  is  most 
important  to focus on the details .  
 
 
Most Significant Type of Issue 
Relationship-based (MST-R) 
MST17: It  is  important to build trust  
and friendship with members of the 
other negotiat ing team. 
 
Basis of Trust 
External (BOT-E) 
BOT47: I  trust  the other party because 
a contract  has been negotiated and 
agreed upon. 
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Basis of Trust 
Internal (BOT-I) 
BOT49: I  trust  the other party because 
we have developed a relationship.  
 
Form of Agreement 
Explicit Contract (FOA-EC) 
FOA67: I  expect to generate a  legally 
binding contract  in negotiat ions.  
FOA68: I  depend on writ ten 
agreements to make i t  clear what each 
party has agreed to do.  
Pan-cultural:     .59 
Finland:            .60 
Mexico:           .57 
Turkey:           .54 
USA:              .69 
Form of Agreement 
Implicit Agreement (FOA-IA) 
FOA69: I  prefer  broad contracts to 
allow for a good working relationship 
to evolve.  
 
 
 
